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7 Machine protection, interlocks and availability 
7.1 Machine protection with a 700 MJ beam 
The combination of high intensity and high energy that characterizes the nominal beam in the LHC leads to a 
stored energy of 362 MJ in each of the two beams. This energy is more than two orders of magnitude larger 
than in any previous accelerator. For the HL-LHC it will increase by another factor of two as shown in the 
comparisons in Figure 7-1. With intensities expected to increase up to 2.3 × 1011 p/bunch with 25 ns bunch 
spacing and 3.7 × 1011 p/bunch with 50 ns bunch spacing [1], an uncontrolled beam loss at the LHC could 
cause even more severe damage to accelerator equipment than at today’s nominal beam parameters. Recent 
simulations that couple energy deposition and hydrodynamic simulation codes show that the nominal LHC 
beam can already penetrate fully through a 20 m long block of copper if the entire beam is accidentally 
deflected. Such an accident could happen if the beam extraction kickers deflect the beam at an incorrect angle. 
Hence, it becomes necessary to revisit many of the damage studies in light of the new beam parameters [2]. In 
addition, new failure scenarios will have to be considered following the proposed optics changes and the 
installation of new accelerator components such as crab cavities and hollow electron beam lenses. Special care 
is required to find a trade-off between equipment protection and machine availability in view of the reduced 
operational margins (e.g. decreasing quench limits and beam loss thresholds versus increased beam intensity 
and tighter collimator settings, UFOs at higher energies, reduced bunch spacing, etc.) 
 Figure 7-1: Stored beam energy as a function of HL-LHC beam momentum in comparison with other particle accelerators. 
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Safe operation of the LHC currently relies on a complex system of equipment protection. The machine 
protection system (MPS) is designed for preventing the uncontrolled release of energy stored in the magnet 
system and damage due to beam losses, with very high reliability. An essential element of the active MPS 
system is the early detection of failures within the equipment. In addition, the beam parameters are monitored 
with fast and reliable beam instrumentation. This is required throughout the entire cycle, from injection to 
collisions. Once a failure is detected by any of the protection systems, the information is transmitted to the 
beam interlock system (BIS), which triggers the extraction of the particle beams via the LHC beam dumping 
system (LBDS). It is essential that the beams are always properly extracted from the accelerator via 700 m 
long transfer lines into large graphite dump blocks. These are the only elements of the LHC that can withstand 
the impact of the full beams. 
The current machine protection architecture is based on the assumption of three types of failure scenarios   
[3]. 
- Ultra-fast failures: failures within less than three turns, e.g. during beam transfer from the SPS to the 
LHC, beam extraction into the LHC beam dump channel, or the effect of missing beam–beam deflection 
during beam extraction (1 LHC turn = 88.9 μs). In the case of these failures, passive protection elements 
are required to intercept the beams and protect the accelerator equipment from damage, as no active 
protection is possible. 
- Fast failures: a timescale of several LHC turns (less than a few milliseconds) as a result of equipment 
failures with a rapid effect on particle trajectories. The active extraction of the beams is completed within 
up to three turns after the detection of the failure and hence provides protection against such failures. 
- Slow failures: multi-turn failures on timescales equal to or more than a few milliseconds, e.g. powering 
failures, magnet quenches, RF failures, etc. 
7.2 Protection against uncontrolled beam losses 
Equipment failures or beam instabilities appearing on the timescale of multiple turns allow for dedicated 
protection systems to mitigate their effects on the circulating beams. Figure 7-2 shows a comparison of the 
failure detection times of different protection systems. As shown in the figure, the LHC beam loss monitoring 
system (BLM) has the fastest detection time of 40 μs. The BLM system is complemented with fast interlocks 
on the beam position in IR6, fast magnet current change monitors (FMCM) and a beam lifetime monitor 
(currently under development by the beam instrumentation group at CERN). All of these systems feature 
similar failure detection times in the 100 μs to 1 ms range, providing diverse redundancy to the BLM system. 
 Figure 7-2: Some failure detection times at the LHC. The shortest failure detection time is currently 
assured by the BLM system, with a fastest integration time of 40 μs, which is equivalent to half a LHC turn. 
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Adding the additional time required to transmit the detected failure through the LHC beam interlock 
system, the time required to synchronize the firing of the beam dump kickers with the abort gap as well as the 
time needed to completely extract the beam from the LHC leads to an equivalent worst case MPS response 
time of three LHC turns after the failure detection as depicted in Figure 7-3. 
 Figure 7-3: Current MPS response time from failure detection to completion of beam dump 
This reaction time is sufficient in the absence of failures occurring on timescales below 10 LHC turns. 
A failure of the normal conducting separation dipole D1 in IP1 and IP5 is currently considered the fastest 
possible failure with circulating beam. Therefore, this was the basis for the design of the current MPS system. 
Due to their location in areas with high beta functions and the fast decay of magnet current in the case of a 
magnet powering failure, these normal conducting magnets can induce fast changes of the particle trajectory. 
These changes lead to rapidly increasing beam losses in the LHC betatron cleaning insertion (IR7), which 
define the smallest aperture in the LHC. At nominal energy and intensity the losses after that special failure 
can reach collimator damage levels within just ten turns. Therefore, a dedicated protection system – the so-
called fast magnet current change monitors (FMCM) – has been very successfully deployed on critical magnets 
in the LHC and its transfer lines in 2006 [4]. 
With the HL-LHC upgrade, the optics in the insertion regions will significantly change. For certain types 
of ATS optics the β-function at the D1 separation dipole magnets in IR1 and IR5 will increase up to ~17 000 m, 
which will enhance its effect on the beam trajectory. The replacement of the D1 separation dipole magnets by 
a superconducting magnet would significantly increase the time constants of these circuits, practically 
mitigating the potential of fast failures originating from these magnets. 
For HL-LHC operation, the use of crab cavities will introduce failures that can affect the particle beams 
on timescales well below the fastest failures considered so far [5]. Studies of different failure scenarios are still 
underway. These studies require consideration of details of the design eventually to be adopted for the crab 
cavity and the corresponding low-level RF system. Both have a significant impact on the effect on the 
circulating beams following, e.g. cavity quenches or trips of the RF power generator. In addition, detailed 
measurements of the quench and failure behaviour of the chosen design have yet to be conducted. First 
experience with similar devices at KEK, however, shows that certain failures can happen within just a few 
turns, as depicted in Figure 7-4. 
While protection against failures with time constants >15ms is not expected to be of fundamental 
concern, voltage and/or phase changes of the crab cavities will happen with a time constant τ, which is 
proportional to Qext. For a 400 MHz cavity with a Qext = 1 × 106 this will result in a time constant as low as 800 
μs. The situation becomes even more critical for cavity quenches, where the energy stored in the cavity can be 
dissipated in the cavity walls on ultra-fast timescales. Failures believed to be quenches observed in cavities at 
KEKB show a complete decay of the cavity voltage within 100 μs, accompanied by an oscillation of the phase 
by 50° in only 50 μs. Such crab cavity failures can imply large global betatron oscillations, which could lead 
to critical beam losses for amplitudes above about 1 σnom. Highly overpopulated transverse tails compared with 
Gaussian beams were measured in the LHC. Based on these observations the energy stored in the tails beyond 
4 σ are expected to correspond to ~30 MJ for HL-LHC parameters. These levels are significantly beyond the 
specification of the collimation system, capable of absorbing up to 1 MJ for very fast accidental beam losses. 
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 Figure 7-4: Schematic overview of crab cavity failure categories [5] 
Therefore, mitigation techniques have to include a fast, dependable, and redundant detection and 
interlocking of a crab cavity failure on these timescales. Appropriate measures must be taken when designing 
the cavity and associated RF control to increase as much as possible the failure time constants. 
- Avoid correlated failures of multiple cavities (on one side of an IP) through mechanical and cryogenic 
separation of the individual modules and appropriate design of the low-level RF [6]. 
- Investigate the use of fast failure detection mechanisms such as RF field monitor probes, diamond beam 
loss detectors, power transmission through input coupler and head–tail monitors. 
- Ensure the partial depletion of the transverse beam tails to reduce the energy stored in the beam halo, 
which would potentially be deflected onto the collimation system beyond the design value of 1 MJ. For 
the current baseline this would correspond to an area of 1.7 σnom (before reaching the closest primary 
collimator) as the possible transverse beam trajectory perturbation following an ultra-fast failure of a 
single crab cavity. It is important to note that the partial depletion of the beam halo may have a negative 
effect on the available time to detect a failure with other machine protection systems like BLMs. The 
consequences of this need to be studied carefully. 
- Decrease the reaction time of the MP system for such ultra-fast failures by, e.g. increasing the number 
of abort gaps, accept the triggering of asynchronous beam dumps with potential local damage, add direct 
links to the beam dumping system in IR6, and consider the installation of disposable absorbers. 
7.2.1 Beam interlock system 
The beam interlock system (BIS) is a highly dependable fast interlock system and a key element of the 
accelerator machine protection. It is currently used in the LHC, SPS, and parts of the injector chain at CERN. 
Its primary objective is to provide a highly reliable link between users requesting a beam abort and the beam 
dumping system. The hardware implementation of the system is based on custom-made electronics, as 
industrial solutions have not been found to be adequate for the specific requirements of the system, e.g. in 
terms of reaction time combined with the geographical distribution of the system. Due to the obsolescence of 
electronics components and potential problems with the optical links the present system will need to be 
upgraded. To fulfil the requirements of the HL-LHC, the system will be equipped with additional input 
channels to connect more user interfaces and to provide more flexibility in the configuration of the various 
user inputs. The number of required channels is subject to a future functional specification to be provided by 
the SPS and LHC machine protection panel (MPP). The possibility of implementing very fast interlock 
channels and direct links between the crab cavities and the LHC beam dumping system will be studied but the 
feasibility cannot yet be confirmed. The new system will be equipped with advanced diagnostic features for 
all optical links allowing pre-emptive maintenance, e.g. in the case of degraded performance due to the 
enhanced radiation load in some underground areas. 
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7.2.1.1 Equipment performance objective 
The upgraded system is supposed to reach the same performance level in terms of reliability as the present 
system, which corresponds to safety integrity level (SIL) 3. The safety critical part of the BIS hardware 
architecture will be based on well-proven principles and solutions but adapted to state-of-the-art electronics 
components and assemblies. It is therefore probably possible to reuse a major part of the safety critical code, 
which is very well tested and fully validated. Considering the system’s complexity and dimensions, and the 
experience gained so far, it is expected that system performance will hardly affect LHC availability, e.g. not 
producing more than one spurious beam abort per year. 
The new BIS could be equipped with a new hardware controls interface, replacing obsolete architectures 
for communication busses and simplifying maintenance and potential upgrades. The BIS hardware will also 
feature advanced diagnostic tools for the system hardware and the optical links. 
All of the proposed changes will require a major revision of the high-level supervision and controls 
software and be adapted to the accelerator controls environment then in place. 
7.2.2 Fast magnet current change monitor 
The main task of the fast magnet current change monitors (FMCM) is to monitor fast current changes in 
electrical circuits with normal conducting magnets. A fast current change can be caused by sudden powering 
failures or perturbations on the supply network, which change the particle trajectories leading to fast beam 
losses. These monitors are required for electrical circuits with a short decay time constant and magnets installed 
in regions with high beta functions. Each monitor delivers a permit signal to the beam interlock system to 
request the extraction of particle beams before losses occur. Therefore, the FMCM provides a redundant 
protection to the beam loss monitors (BLM). A total of 26 monitors are presently installed to protect the LHC 
and SPS-LHC transfer lines. 
7.2.2.1 Objectives for HL-LHC machine performance 
The installation of FMCMs is required to ensure machine protection against powering failures in critical 
magnetic elements during all operational phases. Twelve monitors are currently installed in the LHC, namely 
for dump septa magnets in IR6, collimation insertion regions in IR3/IR7, Alice compensator circuits in IR2, 
and main separation dipoles D1 in IR1 and IR5 [6]. Additional input from WP3 (magnets) and WP2 
(accelerator physics) is required to clarify the necessity of additional FMCM units for the protection of the new 
magnet powering in the high luminosity insertion regions IR1 and IR5 and the HL-LHC optics. In addition, 
new failure modes derived from the introduction of new elements (such as crab cavities) need to be studied to 
understand the machine protection requirements and to estimate the number of monitors required to protect the 
accelerator equipment in the HL-LHC. 
7.2.2.2 Equipment performance objective 
FMCMs have successfully operated in the LHC and the SPS-LHC transfer lines for many years, and no missed 
dump has been identified since the start of operation. For the protection of the electrical circuits in the HL-
LHC the use of the same design is recommended. However, a review of the system needs in view of the HL-
LHC requirements, followed by a corresponding reproduction of additional units, will be required. The review 
and potential redesign of the hardware is a mandatory step due to the aging and obsolescence of the electronics 
parts used in the current system. 
The aim of the upgrade of the FMCM will be to improve the maintainability of the system and to comply 
with the requirements of the HL-LHC. 
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7.3 Magnet powering protection 
During operation at 7 TeV the energy stored in the main dipole circuits of each sector reaches ~1 GJ. This 
illustrates that the LHC magnet system needs to be protected against damage due to failures in magnet 
powering or quenches.  
Therefore, the superconducting circuits, busbars, and future superconducting links must be equipped 
with a quench protection system (QPS) that detects changes in the superconducting state and activates quench 
heaters and/or the energy extraction systems (EE) to safely extract the magnetic energy stored in the circuit. 
Furthermore, the correct powering conditions have to be ensured for each circuit by a powering interlock 
system (PIC), which will interlock the powering of the circuit via the power converter in the case of problems 
and potentially request a beam dump. Therefore, the PIC is interfacing the quench protection systems, power 
converters, cryogenic systems, and technical services such as uninterruptable power supplies (UPS), 
emergency stop buttons (AUG), and controls. 
The protection of the normal conducting magnets in the LHC and its injector complex is ensured by the 
warm magnet interlock system (WIC), which collects signals from thermo switches installed on the magnets 
and status signals from the associated power converters. 
As a failure in the magnet system will also impact the stored particle beam, these systems have to 
interface the magnet powering systems with the BIS and initiate a beam dump in case of a failure. 
7.3.1 Quench protection system 
The HL-LHC will incorporate new superconducting elements requiring dedicated protection systems. The 
upgrade of the QPS will provide this functionality, including the related data acquisition systems, monitoring 
the state of the protection systems and the protected elements. 
The enhanced luminosity of the HL-LHC will increase the radiation levels in certain underground areas 
like the dispersion suppressors to levels no longer compatible with the operation of radiation-tolerant 
electronics based on COTS currently installed in those areas. Based on the progress in electronics, it is probably 
feasible to re-locate a major part of the protection electronics to low radiation zones or, eventually, to surface 
buildings and use long instrumentation cables or optical fibres to link to the protected elements. 
The proposed upgrade will also include new communications links for supervision and data acquisition 
(DAQ) superseding the then obsolete classic fieldbus networks. At the same time, advanced tools for remote 
diagnostics and maintenance will be provided. 
7.3.1.1 Equipment performance objective 
The QPS is a highly complex system incorporating a large amount of electronics components and assemblies. 
As for the existing system, a particular design effort will be necessary to achieve the very demanding level of 
system dependability required for successful LHC operation. The number of accesses to LHC underground 
areas needs to be minimized for personnel protection and machine availability. 
The protection parameter settings will be subject to a functional specification to be issued by the LHC 
magnet circuits, powering and performance panel (MP3) based on the input of equipment specialists. 
The request for very fast magnet protection systems with reaction times in the order of some milliseconds 
will be addressed in a feasibility study, but a potential implementation will rely strongly on the proper 
instrumentation of the protected element (magnet, superconducting link) and the adapted reaction time of other 
protection systems such as energy extraction systems and the powering interlock system. 
The hardware capabilities of the DAQ and related communication links will be enhanced to allow higher 
data transmission rates and advanced maintenance. All of the proposed changes will require a major revision 
of the high-level supervision and controls software, which also needs to be adapted to the accelerator controls 
environment then in place. 
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7.3.2 Energy extraction system 
Energy extraction systems (EE) are an integrated part of the safety-critical quench protection systems, which 
are widely used in the existing LHC machine with a total of 234 installed facilities (202 for the 600 A corrector 
circuits and 32 13 kA systems for the main dipole and quadruple circuits). The systems are strongly circuit-
specific, tailor-made for a particular set of requirements, and adapted to the local infrastructure.  
The current mechanical energy extraction switches will have to be replaced for the HL-LHC era. To 
allow for faster reaction times, which may be required by future superconducting magnets, the development of 
fast switches based on semiconductors (IGCTs, IGBTs) is currently ongoing. Alternatively, slower (~20 ms) 
hybrid systems, where an electromechanical switch is connected in parallel to a semiconductor switch, are 
under study. Furthermore, for slow switching times, classical mechanical switches in combination with large 
snubber capacitor banks could be used. 
The new design of the extraction resistors (DQR) will be significantly different from those developed 
and built for the present LHC main circuits. The pursued characteristics and properties of these new energy 
absorbers are very fast recovery (cooling) times, compact design (minimized volume), and easily changeable 
resistance values. 
7.3.2.1 Equipment performance objectives 
The new energy extraction equipment for the HL-LHC will use a new generation of switches, incorporate the 
newest technology for high-current transmission, benefit from built-in features for facilitating diagnostics and 
maintenance, offer systems that will minimize intervention time for accessing all parts of the facilities, and 
profit from the experience gained with the operation of the existing LHC EE facilities. 
7.3.3 Powering interlock system 
The powering interlock system (PIC) ensures the correct powering conditions for the different electrical 
circuits with superconducting magnets in the LHC. At the same time, it guarantees the protection of the magnet 
equipment by interfacing quench protection systems, power converters, cryogenics, and technical services such 
as uninterruptable power supplies (UPS), emergency stop buttons (AUG), and controls. The PIC is a distributed 
system currently consisting of 36 individual powering interlock controllers, which manage the powering of 
each of the 28 powering subsectors [7]. 
7.3.3.1 Objective for HL-LHC machine performance 
Magnet interlocks are required to guarantee safe magnet powering during all phases of operation from injection 
to collisions. In order to achieve this protection while maintaining the time constraints required for equipment 
protection, interlock electronics are usually installed close to the main clients (QPS and power converters) such 
as the UA, UJ, and RR alcoves. At the design luminosity for HL-LHC (5 × 1034 cm−2 s−1) the thermal neutron 
and high-energy hadron fluencies in the areas close to the tunnel will increase considerably with respect to the 
values for which the existing PIC has been designed. Additional changes and requirements from the new 
quench protection system will have to be reflected in the upgraded interlock system to assure the dependability 
of the system during the HL-LHC era. For these reasons, a new design for the distributed I/O modules is 
required to cope with the increment of particle flux in the most sensitive areas. In addition, an upgrade of the 
industrial components used will very likely become necessary due to the changing of the low-level I/O 
components used. 
7.3.3.2 Equipment performance objectives 
The PIC was installed during 2006 and has been operating since the start of LHC operation in 2008. By the 
time the HL-LHC starts operation the system will have been running for more than 15 years. Therefore, some 
of the electronics components will reach the end of their life expectancy, which can have an impact on the 
availability of the system. In addition, obsolescence of electronics parts needs to be addressed since some of 
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the critical components of the system can no longer be purchased on the open market, affecting its 
maintainability. Furthermore, the increased radiation dose in certain areas will affect the most sensitive 
components of the PIC. 
The upgrade of the PIC will address the issues mentioned above to adapt to HL-LHC requirements. In 
addition, the system will be reviewed to provide enhanced diagnostics of the safety-critical hardwired loops in 
line with the upgrades foreseen for the quench protection system. The implementation of triple redundancy in 
combination with two-out-of-three voting is considered for the quench loop. 
7.3.4 Warm magnet interlock system (WIC) 
The warm magnet interlock system (WIC) assures the protection of normal conducting magnets in the LHC 
and its injector complex. It collects signals from thermo switches installed on the magnets and status signals 
from the associated power converters. Based on these input signals a programmable logic controller (PLC) 
calculates and transmits fast abort signals to interlock the power converter of a given electrical circuit in case 
of powering failures. In addition, it initiates a beam dump in case a circuit relevant for beam operation of the 
given machine is not operating in nominal conditions [8]. 
7.3.4.1 Objective for the HL-LHC machine performance 
Magnet interlocks are required to guarantee safe magnet powering during all phases of operation from injection 
to collisions and to abort beam operation avoiding inevitable beam losses in case of powering failures. In 
addition, interlock systems provide remote diagnostic features to allow an efficient and precise identification 
of faulty equipment. As normal conducting magnets in the LHC are concentrated around the IPs, a single 
industrial controller installed in a radiation-free area is required to manage the protection of powering 
equipment in a given IR. The main objective for the HL-LHC era is a consolidation of the existing system, 
along with an upgrade to accommodate changes and new requirements for the magnet powering system in the 
different insertion regions. 
7.3.4.2 Equipment performance objectives 
The WIC – consisting of eight industrial controllers and several I/O crates – has been installed in the LHC 
since 2006 and has been continuously operating since the start of LHC operation in 2008. No failures have 
been observed in the WIC system throughout the whole of Run 1. Nevertheless, by the time the HL-LHC starts 
operation the WIC system will have been running for more than 15 years, requiring an upgrade of the 
electronics and industrial components to assure the current level of dependability throughout the full HL-LHC 
period. Furthermore, the increased radiation dose in certain areas will affect the most sensitive components of 
the WIC (mostly the magnet and remote test interconnection boxes) for which a new design and production 
has to be envisaged. 
7.4 Availability requirements to achieve HL-LHC goals for integrated luminosity 
The challenging goals in terms of integrated luminosity require a high level of accelerator availability and 
operational efficiency. The estimated integrated luminosity as a function of machine availability is analyzed 
below. There are three important figures to be considered when evaluating LHC availability. 
- The stable beams time: the time for beam collisions. This quantity must be optimized by operators as a 
function of the observed distributions of turnaround time and fault time. Stable beam optimization will 
be particularly relevant for levelled operation. 
- The turnaround time: the time to go from a beam dump at the end of stable beams to the next stable 
beams, when no faults occur. This quantity has a minimum value imposed by the injection process and 
the ramp time of superconducting magnets. Efforts must be devoted to reaching this lower value. 
Parallelizing/combining machine modes (e.g. collide and squeeze) is one possibility to optimize the 
turnaround time. 
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- The fault time: the time to clear machine faults and recover operational conditions for beam injection. It 
includes the time for expert diagnostics and intervention, eventually requiring access to the LHC tunnel. 
For the following extrapolations, the 2012 LHC run is taken as a reference, being the most stable and 
reproducible year of the first LHC run [9]. In 2012 the average turnaround time was 5.5 h, but the energy was 
limited to 4 TeV, requiring current ramps of only 13 min. For HL-LHC operation, the reference energy will be 
7 TeV, resulting in an increased average turnaround time, estimated to be 6.2 h. Making predictions of the fault 
time distribution for HL-LHC operation is not trivial, as many factors will play a role in this respect. The 
increased energies and intensities will result in higher radiation levels, which could have a direct impact on the 
observed number of single event effects (SEE) per year and on long-term effects on components due to the 
total integrated dose (TID). Mitigations to these effects have been deployed during LS1, with a major relocation 
of sensitive equipment in protected areas of the LHC tunnel. Nevertheless, future radiation levels will have to 
be measured for a final assessment of the expected increase in beam dumps due to radiation effects in 
electronics components (R2E). It is already foreseen that a new generation of electronics systems will be 
designed before the HL-LHC era. New designs should cope with such radiation levels. The increased energy 
and intensities will also have a direct impact on the observed UFO-induced beam dumps due to localized 
losses. Current extrapolations assume a significant increase of UFO events that are large enough to provoke a 
beam dump, if 2012-like BLM thresholds are to be kept. A balance between the tolerated number of UFO 
dumps and the possibility of having beam-induced quenches should be found, by the definition of suitable 
threshold and, eventually, BLM relocation. On the equipment side, components will operate closer to design 
limits and partially reach their end-of-life. 
A Monte Carlo model [10, 11] of LHC availability was used to qualitatively assess the combined impact 
of all these factors. A sensitivity analysis has been carried out with respect to the average fault time and 
machine failure rate, defined as the ratio between fills to stable beams followed by failures and the total number 
of physics fills. The results for 200 days of HL-LHC operation are presented in Figure 7-5. Nominal HL-LHC 
parameters (5 × 1034 s−1 cm−2 levelled luminosity, 2.19 × 1035 s−1 cm−2 virtual peak luminosity, 4.5 h average 
luminosity lifetime, 7 TeV) and the same duration of intensity ramp-up as 2012 were assumed. 
The results show that, assuming 2012 figures for average fault duration (6.9 h) and machine failure rate 
(70%), 260 fb−1 could be produced in 200 days of HL-LHC operation. To reach the goal of 300 fb−1 per year, 
a reduction of 10% of the machine failure rate, combined with a reduction of the average fault time of around 
25%, are necessary (HL1). As an alternative for reaching 300 fb−1, the sensitivity analysis shows that a further 
reduction of the machine failure rate to 50% would keep the same average system fault time as observed in 
2012 (HL2). These requirements in particular need to be considered during the design of future electronics 
equipment. 
 Figure 7-5: Sensitivity analysis of integrated luminosity to the machine failure rate and average fault time. 
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